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In very general terms there is no doubt that national security
and foreign policy interests are reflected in the United
Kingdom's foreign trade policy. It can be safely asserted that
there is close cooperation at the institutional level between
private industry and the government with regard to these mat-
ters. Yet as one moves away from such generalized statements
and attempts to give a detailed account of the interaction that
does exist, the lack of visibility of this interaction becomes ap-
parent. The relatively closed nature of government in the United
Kingdom' and the lack of enthusiasm that seems to persist with
regard to on-the-record briefings of the press, let alone the
public, 2 mean that the true nature of the interaction between
government and private industry has to be gleaned almost ex-
clusively from the occasional indicia that surface.
One of the most dramatic examples of government-private
industry interaction occurred in the spring of 1980. There were
reports that intense pressure was being placed on the British
government to block the televising of the film Death of a
Princess, co-produced by British ATV and Boston's WGBH-TV.
It is at least arguable that both foreign policy and economic in-
* Lecturer in Law, University of Exeter; Visiting Assistant Professor
of Law, Saint Louis University; B.A. (Law), Kingston Polytechnic (1975);
LL.B., University of Cambridge (1976).
1. Crick, "Them and Us": Public Impotence and Government Power,
1968 PUB. LAW 8.
2. It is not intended to give the impression that government in the
United Kingdom is always actively covert, but rather that the public's access
to what public decisionmaking does exist is severely limited because of e.g.,
the prohibition on T.V. coverage of Parliamentary proceedings. Additionally,
it should be noted that ancilliary Parliamentary bodies lack the sophistication
and openness of their U.S. analogues; see, e.g., Casper, The Committee
System of the United States Congress 26 AM. J. COMP. L. (Supp.) 359 (1978).
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terests favored cancellation of the program, but the strength of
the British media lobby ensured that the film was not only
broadcast, but also distributed outside the United Kingdom. The
failure of the combined government and industry pressure led to
temporary economic and political reprisals by the Saudi Arabian
governmentA Similarly, in the United States, neither White
House nor oil industry pressure could dissuade PBS from airing
the program. 4 Recourse to the courts, either before or after the
telecast, was generally unprofitable, 5 although one case did go to
trial.6
3. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1980, §A, at 7, col. 1; Apr. 25, 1980, §C,
at 28, col. 1; May 7, 1980, §C, at 21, col. 1; May 11, 1980, §D, at 37, col. 1;
Jun. 26, 1980, §d, at 1, col. 1; Jul. 27, 1980, §A, at 11, col. 1; Jul. 29, 1980,
§A, at 2, col. 6. See also NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1980, at 86. TIME, May 19,
1980, at 46.
4. N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1980, §C at 28, col. 1; May 9, 1980, §A, at
10, col. 1; May 10, 1980, §C, at 48, col. 3.
5. See Dalrymple v. Corporation for Pub. Broadcasting, No. 80-807
(N.D. Ga. May 12, 1980); Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm., No.
80-0607 (N.D. Ala. May 12, 1980); Thorne v. Grossman, No. 80-1827 (N.D.
Cal. May 12, 1980); NEWS, MEDIA AND THE LAW, June-July 1980, at 8; Khalid
Abdullah Tariq Al Mansour Faissal Fahd Al Talal v. Fanning, 506 F.Supp.
186 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (dismissal of $20 billion defamation suit brought
against broadcasters by "representatives" of 600 million Muslims); NEWS,
MEDIA AND THE LAW, Oct.-Nov. 1980, at 23.
6. In Barnstone v. University of Houston, 487 F.Supp. 1347 (S.D.
Tex. 1980), a subscriber to and viewer of the local PBS station, owned and
operated by defendant, was granted a temporary restraining order directing
the station to air "Death of a Princess" at the scheduled time (May 12, 1980).
The court issued the injunction on the basis that there was a substantial
likelihood that the plaintiff would be able to establish a denial of her first
amendment rights at trial. On the day scheduled for broadcast, the district
court's order was vacated by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
on condition that appellants would tape and preserve the program for possi-
ble future broadcast. University of Houston v. Barnstone, No. 80-1527 (5th
Cir. May 12, 1980). Later that same day, Justice Powell denied an applica-
tion to vacate the order of the appellate court. Barnstone v. University of
Houston, 466 U.S. 1318 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1980). When the case came
to trial, the T.V. station was ordered to broadcast the show within thirty
days. Barnstone v. University of Houston, No. H-80-1048 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 18,
1980). The court was of the opinion that the state owned and operated T.V.
station could not claim exemption from such a violation of first amendment
rights:
The Court refuses to carve out such an exception to the Bill of
Rights. To do so would in effect encourage the plainting [sic] of
seedlings which, upon attaining full growth, would install the State of
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It is not always the case that the indicia evidencing the im-
pact of British security and foreign policy interests on her inter-
national trade, and hence the institutional interaction between
government and private industry, operate outside of any legal
framework. There is United Kingdom legislation7 requiring that
a license must be obtained from the Department of Trade prior
to the export of certain strategic goods. Aspects of this control
regime have a limited extraterritorial effect. 8 In a more positive
vein, the Export Credits Guarantee Department (E.C.G.D.) is
expressly empowered 9 to take into account certain foreign policy
objectives 10 when considering requests for insurance for export
credit advanced by U.K. businesses." The Department need not
apply commercial criteria only but may issue its guarantees to
further foreign relations, typically with Third World countries.
Texas, through its University of Houston, as a kind of "Ministry of
Truth" as portended in George Orwell's 1984. Such absolute control
over what the people may see and hear will not be countenanced in
1980. Id. (citation omitted).
7. Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defense) Act, 1939, s.l.,
Emergency Laws (Re-Enactments and Repeals) Act, 1964, s.3(1). The current
regulations in force by virtue of the above are, Export of Goods (Control)
Order 1978, S.I. 1978 No. 796, as amended, and Strategic Goods (Control)
Order 1967, S.I. 1967 No. 983, respectively. See generally C. SCHMITTHOFF,
SCHMITTHOFF'S EXPORT TRADE 461-65 (7th ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as
SCHMITTHOFF], United States v. Brumage, 377 F.Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y. 1974);
Berman & Garson, United States Export Controls-Past, Present, and Future,
67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, Reynolds, State Department-Arms Sales, 10 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 101 (1978), Winter & Carlson, Exporting Licensing: Unco-
ordinated Trade Repression, 9 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 333 (1979), Abbott,
Linking Trade to Political Goals: Foreign Policy Export Controls in the 1970s
and 1980s, 65 MINN. L. REV. 739 (1981).
8. Strategic Goods (Control) Order 1967, Art. 1.
9. Export Guarantees and Overseas Investment Act 1978 c. 18. The
authority given under the legislation is vested in the Secretary of State for
Trade but exercised by E.C.G.D. (id. s.12(12)).
10. See generally SCHMITTHOFF, Ch.22; cf. Streng, Government Sup-
ported Export Credit: United States Competitiveness, 10 INT'L LAW. 401
(1976). At the European "federal" level, see Council Decision of September
27, 1960, 1960 J.O. 1339; Dec. 73/391/EEC, 1973 O.J. L346/1; Dec.
70/509/EEC, 1970 O.J. Sp.Ed. (III) 762; Dec. 70/510/EEC, 1970 O.J. Sp.
Ed. (III) 782; Dec. 70/552/EEC, 1970 O.J. Sp.Ed. (III) 966; Dec.
71/86/EEC, 1971 O.J. Sp.Ed. (I) 71; Act of Accession, Art. 152.
11. The Export Guarantees and Overseas Investment Act 1978 s.2(1)
states:
For the purpose of encouraging trade with other countries or for the
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As one's definitional net is cast wider it is possible to identify
some less obvious areas where the interests of the state and
private corporations, or British foreign policy and foreign trade,
either conflict or conjoin; the whole area of sovereign
immunity,1 2 the British "response" to the Arab boycott, 13 and
the extraterritorial nature of some foreign antitrust laws all have
an impact. With regard to this last area, even the "special rela-
tionship" between Britain and the United States has been strained
by the growing extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law' 4
and has led to robust reactions from both the judiciary'5 and the
legislature 16 in Britain. In passing, it should be noted that there
is a certain irony in this, in that "federal" Europe, to which Bri-
tain now belongs, is at the same time asserting the extrater-
ritorial nature of its own antitrust laws.' 7
purpose of rendering economic assistance to countries outside the
United Kingdom, the Secretary of State may, with the consent of the
Treasury, make arrangements for giving such guarantees to, or for
the benefit of, persons carrying on business in the United Kingdom as
appear to him to be expedient in the national interest ....
12. State Immunity Act 1978 c. 33. See generally DICEY & MORRIS.
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 138-57 (9th ed. 1973; cum. supp. 1980); White,
The State Immunity Act 1978, 1979 JBL 105; cf. Foreign Sovereign Im-
munities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §1602 et seq. (1976).
13. Goldstein, European Views of United States Anti-Bribery and
Anti-Boycott Legislation 1 NW. J. OF INT'L. L. & Bus. 363, 367 (1979); Turck,
A Comparative Study of Non-United States Responses to the Arab Boycott, 8
GA. J. INTL. & COMP. L. 711, 722-726 (1978).
14. E.g., United States v. Aluminium Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945); United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center,
Inc., 133 F.Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), motion for reargument denied, 134
F.Supp. 710 (1955); Hacking, The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S.
Laws: A Cause for Concern Amongst Friends of America, 1 NW. J. OF INT'L.
L. & Bus. 1 (1979), Norton, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of U.S. Antitrust
and Securities Laws, 28 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 575 (1979).
15. British Nylon Spinners Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd.,
[1953] 1 Ch. 19 interlocutory proceedings, [1955] 1 Ch. 37, In Re
Westinghouse Electric Corporation Uranium Contract Litigation MDL Docket
No. 235, 21 C.M.L.R. 100 (1978 HL). See also Smith, Discovery of
Documents Located Abroad in U.S. Antitrust Litigation: Recent Develop-
ments in the Law Concerning the Foreign Illegality Excuse for Nonproduc-
tion, 14 VA. J. INT'L. L. 747, 761 (1964).
16. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980.
17. E.g., Re Continental Can Company Inc., 11 C.M.L.R. DIl (1971
E.C. Commission), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Europemballage Corp.
v. E.C. Commission, 12 C.M.L.R. 199 (1973 ECJ); Imperial Chem. In-
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An example of the continued search for a workable form of
government-industry interaction in the realms of national secur-
ity and foreign policy is to be found in the circumstances sur-
rounding the enforcement of sanctions against Rhodesia. It is
arguable that the failure of the Rhodesian oil embargo indicates
the inability of the British government to harness fully the
strength of the private sector to achieve foreign policy objectives.
Moreover, the embargo's failure may be seen as further evidence
of the general inappropriateness of economic sanctions given the
worldwide context in which the private sector operates today.,
The unilateral declaration of independence by the govern-
ment of the then Colony of Southern Rhodesia on November 11,
1965 drew condemnation from the United Nations19 and a
reassertion by the United Kingdom Parliament of Rhodesia's col-
onial status.20 At the same time the United Kingdom govern-
ment was empowered by Parliament to impose sanctions on
Rhodesia. 21 Pursuant to that legislation, sanctions were imposed
with respect to petroleum products. 22
dus. Ltd. v. E.G. Commission, 11 C.M.L.R. 557 (1972 ECJ); Hoffman-
LaRoche & Co. A.G. v. Commission of the European Communities, 26
C.M.L.R. 211 (1979 ECJ); H. SMIT & P.E. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 3-13 (1976, 1981 Supp.), Kruithof, The
Application of the Common Market Anti-Trust Provisions to International
Restraints of Trade, 2 C.M.L. REV. 69 (1964), Allen, The Development of
European Economic Community Anti-trust Jurisdiction Over Alien Undertak-
ings, [1974/2] L.I.E.I. 35, Bellis, International Trade and the Competition
Law of the European Economic Community, 16 C.M.L. REV. 647 (1979).
18. M. DOxEY, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL EN-
FORCEMENT 73-79 (2nd ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DOXEY], Wasserman,
Economic Sanctions-The Rhodesian Experience, 9 J. OF WORLD TRADE L.
590 (1975).
19. U.N. Security Council Resolution, No. 216 November 12, 1965,
6 I.L.M. 167 (1966), No. 217 November 20, 1965 6 I.L.M. 167 (1966);
Hopkins, International Law-Southern Rodesia-United Nations-Security
Council, 1967 C.L.J. 1.
20. Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, c. 76, s.1. See generally, Dias, The
U.D.L Case: The Grundnorm in Travail, 1967 C.L.J. 5, Marshall, The Legal
Effects of U.D.L, 17 INT'L COMP. L. Q. 1022 (1968), Leigh, Rhodesia After
U.D.L Some Aspects of a Peaceful Rebellion, 1966 PUB. LAW 148, Mac-
farlane, Pronouncing on Rebellion: The Rhodesian Courts and U.D.I., 1968
PUB. LAW 325.
21. Southern Rhodesia Act, 1965, c.76, s. 2(2)(c).
22. The Southern Rhodesia (Petroleum) Order 1965, S.I. 1965 No.
2140. This order was revoked and replaced by the Southern Rhodesia (United
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That petroleum and petroleum products continued to reach
the illegal Rhodesian regime despite the sanctions was generally
known. In all probability this continued supply was also in-
evitable, given the sympathies of the South African government 23
and many of its citizens, 24 the Portugese government 25 and the
then Portugese colony of Mozambique. The extent of the in-
volvement of British companies in that continued supply did not
become widely known, however, until the publication of a report
in the United States, 25 a limited Senate investigation, 27 and,
finally, the publication of the findings of an inquiry commis-
sioned by the United Kingdom government. 28
This official inquiry determined that there had been a con-
tinued involvement by British oil companies in the supply of oil
to the illegal regime throughout the period 1966-1975. During
this period three phases were identified; subsidiaries of British oil
companies located in southern Africa were involved during all
three, but of more importance was the extent of the British
parent companies' knowledge of their subsidiaries' activities. 29
According to the official report, petroleum products original-
ly were supplied via the Mozambique subsidiary pursuant to con-
tracts between the South African subsidiary and middlemen act-
ing for the Rhodesians."0 The second phase began in 1968 when
Nations Sanction) (No. 2) Order 1968, S.I. 1968 No. 1020 following U.N.
Security Council Resolution No. 253, May 29, 1968 7 I.L.M. 897 (1968). See,
DOXEY, supra note 18 at 65-73, Halderman, Some Legal Aspects of Sanctions
In The Rhodesian Case, 17 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 672 (1968), Joyner, Interna-
tional Sanctions, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 319 (1974). For the scope of the ap-
plicable sanctions regulations see T.H. BINGHAM & S.M. GRAY, REPORT ON
THE SUPPLY OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS TO RHODESIA (1978) Ch. II,
§2.11-2.14 [hereinafter cited as BINGHAM].
23. E.g., BINGHAM supra note 22 at Ch. III, §3.2-3.9; Ch. V,
§5.9-5.13.
24. E.g., BINGHAM, supra note 22 at Ch. V, §5.77-5.81.
25. E.g., BINGHAM supra note 22 at Ch. V, §5.40-5.41.
26. THE CENTER FOR SOCIAL ACTION OF THE UNITED CHURCH OF
CHRIST, THE OIL CONSPIRACY (1976); cf. BINGHAM, Ch. XIII, §13.16.
27. Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the
Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, September 17,
1976.
28. See BINGHAM, supra note 22. For BINGHAM'S terms of reference
see id. at iii.
29. For BINGHAM'S factual conclusions see id., Ch. XIV, §14.3.
30. Id. Ch. VII.
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the involvement of tfe British-owned subsidiaries was disguised
by an arrangement with the South African subsidiary of a
French oil company. Those customers suspected of operating as
middlemen for the Salisbury regime would receive their oil from
this "French" sotirce; an equal amount of oil then being
transferred from the British-owned subsidiary in South Africa to
the French-owned subsidiary.3 ' The third stage of the supply
story began at the end of 1971 with the cessation of the ex-
change arrangement with the French and the direct involve-
ment, once more, of the British-owned Mozambique
subsidiary.32
To a certain extent, it would be harsh to judge the first and
third phases of this continued supply of "British" oil to the il-
legal Rhodesian regime as an example of the inability of the
United Kingdom government to rely on the cooperation of the
private sector in securing its foreign policy objectives; "harsh"
because of the relative ignorance of the British-based parent
companies as to the activities of their subsidiaries.3 3 The second
phase (the exchange agreement) however, was known to the
parent companies3 4 and, indeed, to the United Kingdom govern-
ment.3 5 Furthermore the government believed that it was con-
tinued with after 1971.36 This second phase may, perhaps, be seen
as an illustration of a more effective cooperation between the
public and private sectors, as an effective compromise between
economic and foreign policy interests and foreign policy interests
competing inter se. This conclusion may be posited because the ex-
change agreement permitted the subsidiaries of the British-based
companies to continue trading in countries sympathetic to the
Rhodesian regime, avoided any more severe strain on Anglo-
South African relations and yet enabled the British to honor the
letter, if not the spirit, of the oil embargo and thus did not
jeopardize United Kingdom foreign relations with other countries
in Africa. 37 Any positive view taken of this episode should be
31. Id. Ch. VII, §8.2-8.13.
32. Id. Ch. VIII, §8.16-8.108.
33. Id. Ch. VI, §6.31-6.33, Ch. VIII, §8.13-8.74, Ch. XIV,
§14.13-14.16, §14.20-14.27.
34. Id. Ch. VI, §6.54-§6.70, Ch. VIII, §8.7.
35. Id. Ch. VI, §6.71-6.85, Ch. XIV, §14.17.
36. Id. Ch. XIII, §13.19-13.23, Ch. XIV, §14.22-14.27.
37. Id. Ch. VI, §6.75-6.76, 6.85-6.86, Ch. XIV, §14.4 (xix), 14.19.
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qualified by an appreciation of the embarrassment suffered by
the government of the United Kingdom when not only the "ex-
change" agreement itself became publicly known but also the fact
that the government did not know that it had ended.
The official inquiry made no recommendations as to the
possibility of invoking the criminal sanctions available to the
United Kingdom government,"8 and as peace came to Rhodesia-
Zimbabwe with the signing of the Lancaster House agreement,3 9
it is hardly surprising that no prosecutions have been brought.
Nor is it surprising that the English civil courts have refuged to
entertain the matter.40
Before the Lancaster House agreement was reached, the
Rhodesian crisis had become a European as well as a British af-
fair. This involvement arose not merely from European countries
complying with the applicable Security Council Resolutions but
also from the United Kingdom's accession to the European
Economic Communities (EEC). 41 As a postscript, therefore, to
the Rhodesian example, it should be noted that Zimbabwe has
now become the sixtieth signatory to the Lom6 Convention, 42 the
trade and cooperation treaty between the EEC and African,
Caribbean, and Pacific countries (EEC/ACP). 43 -
Indeed, it is in the European context that future develop-
ments with regard to the continued interaction between United
Kingdom foreign policy and trading interests will take place.
Although a founding member of NATO, 44 the Council of
Europe45 and other early European supranational organizations, 46
38. Id. Ch. XIV, §14.2.
39. 19 I.L.M. 387 (1980); see also Zimbabwe Act 1979.
40. Lonrho Ltd. v. Shell Petroleum (UK) Ltd, The Times Law
Report, THE TIMES (LONDON), December 1, 1980, §1, at 5, col.1. (denial of
civil remedy based on possible breach of sanction orders).
41. Kuyper, Sanctions Against Rhodesia: The EEC and the Im-
plementation of General International Legal Rules, 12 C.M.L. REV. 231
(1975).
42. BULL. EC 4-1980, point 1.4.1. ff; EUROFORUM, 10/80, p. 11;
12/80, p. 10; BULL. EC 11-1980, point 1.4.1. ff; 18/80, p. 10. See also, Reg.
3550/80, 1980 O.J. L372/1 (interim agreement between EEC and
Zimbabwe).
43. 19 I.L.M. 327 (1980).
44. The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington April 4, 1949 (amended
by Protocol, London October 17, 1951).
45. The Statute of the Council of Europe, London May 5, 1949
(amended May 22, 1951; December 18, 1951; May 4, 1953; May 30, 1958).
46. E.g. O.E.E.C. (Convention on European Economic Co-operation)
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it was not until the United Kingdom's accession 47 to the EEC48
that the trade aspects of her foreign policy became institu-
tionalized at any level other than the purely national.
Space does not permit an outline of the origins of the EEC -a
genesis involving economics, security, and post-World War II
regionalism - nor of the disinterest originally displayed by the
United Kingdom toward the Communities.49 Suffice it to say
that, since 1973, the United Kingdom's immediate-in the
geographical sense-foreign policy and security interests have
become inextricably linked to her economic interests within the
quasi-federal structure of the EEC.
The repercussions of the United Kingdom's accession to the
EEC are not limited to the immediate geographical area of
Western Europe. The membership of the EEC has strained rela-
tions with former colonies, such as New Zealand, because of the
Community's agricultural policy, and involved the United
Kingdom in clashes of interest with traditional allies such as the
United States.5 0 Of still more importance is the fact that, as a
Paris April 16, 1948-later to become O.E.C.D. (Convention on the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) Paris December
14, 1960; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms Rome, November 4, 1950.
47. Treaty of Accession, Brussels, January 22, 1972; United Kingdom
Membership became effective on January 1, 1973. For a contemporary view
on the probable impact of accession on British foreign policy see Wallace,
British External Relations and the European Community: The Changing
Context of Foreign Policy-Making, 12 J. OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 28
(1973).
48. The three European Communities (European Coal and Steel Com-
munity, Paris April 18, 1951; European Atomic Energy Community, Rome
March 25, 1957 and the EEC) were effectively merged into one by The Con-
vention on Certain Institutions Common to The European Communities,
Rome March 25, 1957 and the Treaty Establishing A Single Council and A
Single Commission of The European Communities, Brussels, April 8, 1965.
49. See generally A.H. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS (3rd
ed. 1973) Ch. 1. [hereinafter cited as ROBERTSON]; D. LASOK and J.W.
BRIDGE, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (2nd ed. 1976) Ch. 1; P.J.G. KAPTEYN AND P. VERLOREN VAN
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
(1973) Ch. 1. For a more detailed analysis see, E.B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF
EUROPE (1968).
50. See e.g., Aspects of the European Communities, a report prepared
for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on
Foreign affairs, U.S. House of Representatives (1979) pp. 34-41, Jackson,
United States-EEC Trade Relations: Constitutional Problems of Economic In-
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matter of law, it is the Community's supranational institutions
that are responsible for matters relating to commercial policy,51
relations with international organizations, 52 and the conclusion
of association agreements with third countries.5 3 Also, in very
general terms, it has been established that whenever Community
institutions have competence as to the internal market, they may
also have external competence, arising by implication from the
Treaty of Rome.5 4
Notwithstanding the immense power placed in the hands of
the Community institutions and the obviously close, indeed
overlapping, relationship between such international trade mat-
ters and foreign policy concerns, the EEC institutions are not
empowered to involve themselves directly in foreign policy or na-
tional security strictu sensu. The Treaty is concerned only with
economic activity5 5 and contains express national derogations
terdependence, 16 C.M.L. REV. 453 (1979). See also text accompanying notes
14-17 supra.
51. EEC Treaty arts. 112-114. The issue of Community competence is
well settled; Opinion 1/75 Re The OECD Understanding on a Local Cost
Standard, 17 C.M.L.R. 85 (1976 ECJ). The question of when such com-
petence is exclusive is more complex; Opinion 1/79 Re the Draft Interna-
tional Agreement on Natural Rubber, 26 C.M.L.R. 639 (1979 ECJ). See
Usher, 5 E.L. REV. 147 (1980). See Kapteyn, The Common Commercial
Policy of the European Economic Community: Delimitation of the Communi-
ty's Power and the European Court of Justice's Opinion of November 11,
1975, 11 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 485 (1976), Steenbergen, The Common Commer-
cial Policy, 17 C.M.L. REV. 229 (1980). For the internal effect of such com-
petence see e.g., Case 38/75 Customs Agent of the Dutch Railways v. Inspec-
tor of Customs and Excise, 17 C.M.L.R. 167, 177-178 (1976 ECj).
52. EEC Treaty art. 229.
53. EEC Treaty art. 238. E.g. EEC/ACP Treaty supra note 43. See
generally E. FREY-WOUTERS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND THE THIRD
WORLD (1980), Simmonds, The Second Lomd Convention: The Innovative
Features, 17 C.M.L. REV. 415 (1980). The relationship between the EEC and
many of the Lom6 Countries was originally governed by EEC Treaty arts,
131-136.
54. Case 22/70 Re the European Road Transport Agreement; E.C.
Commission v. Council, 10 C.M.L.R. 335 (1971 ECJ), Cases 3-4, 6/76 Officer
Van Justitie v. Kramer, 18 C.M.L.R. 440 (1976 ECJ), Opinion 1/76 Re the
Draft Agreement Establishing a European Laying-Up Fund for Inland Water-
way Vessels, 20 C.M.L.R. 279 (1977 ECJ), Case 61/77 Re Sea Fishery Restric-
tions; E.C. Commission v. Eire, 22 C.M.L.R. 456, 515 (1978 ECJ). In
general, on the question of the exclusivity of this Competence, see Leopold,
External Relations Power of EEC in Theory and in Practice, 26 I.C.L.Q. 54
(1977).
55. EEC Treaty arts. 2, 3.
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with regard to security matters. 5 Nevertheless, given two recent
institutional developments, the EEC may be seen as in the pro-
cess of a de facto expansion of its competence into the realm of
foreign policy involvement. The sidelining of adventurous ideas
calling for a European Political Union 57 in favor of a more rea-
listic European Political Cooperation 58 has provided the back-
ground for both of these institutional changes. First, at the 1974
Paris summit, the EEC countries created the European Coun-
cil5 9 - effectively the EEC Council of Ministers meeting in the
context of European Political Cooperation. 60 It is now feasible
for the EEC member states to speak with one voice with regard
to foreign policy and European security, and thereby to deal
within one institutional framework with EEC issues, matters on
the leading edge of Community competence, 61 and traditional
foreign policy or national security subjects.
Of far more importance in the context of this paper is the
fact that, almost by definition, the European Council provides a
forum to deal with the economic aspects of foreign policy. Thus,
it was the European Council that not only condemned the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan but also laid down the European policy
of ensuring that embargoed United States agricultural products
would not be replaced from European sources. 62 Similarly, it was
under the auspices of European Political Cooperation that sanc-
56. Id. arts. 36 (2), 223.
57. See e.g., ROBERTSON supra note 49 at 293-7.
58. REPORT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE MEMBER STATES ON
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tions were imposed against Iran following the seizure of the
American hostages.
63
The second major institutional change concerns the Euro-
pean Parliament. Its legal nature remains unchanged; it is still
basically only a consultative body. 64 However, it has grown both
in size and in importance now that it is directly elected rather
than being composed merely of representatives of the parlia-
ments of member states. 65 As the new Parliament has begun to
assert itself, so also has it begun to interest itself in matters not
dealt with by the Rome Treaty. Parliamentary question time is
no longer concerned solely with mainstream EEC matters but
also involves interrogatories addressed to the Council of Ministers
meeting in political cooperation. 66 In addition, the Council
President now reports to the Parliament on the activities of the
European Council. 67 It remains to be seen, however, whether the
European Parliament will become a major force in dealing with
the economic aspects of foreign policy.
Nevertheless, the future is sure to bring further institutional
changes to the Community,6 8 and this future will surely see the
EEC as the principal organ through which the economic aspects
of foreign policy and national security are dealt with in
Europe. 69
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